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First, Do No Harm: Health Professionals and
Guantánamo
Leonard S. Rubenstein ∗
I would like to thank the organizers of this event for this important teach-in and convening this panel to address the ways in which
health professionals have become embroiled in human rights violations against detainees in U.S. custody. Just as the embrace by the
Bush Administration of torture as an interrogation strategy led to a
corrosion of law, so did it undermine the ethics of the health professions and the integrity of the tradition, within the military, of medical
independence and commitment to the health of soldiers and detainees. What is surprising is not that physicians, psychologists, and other
health workers can become enmeshed in the machinery of torture,
from design to execution to monitoring⎯there is a long history of
1
such engagement. Rather, what is startling is the ease with which
this role was officially developed and new rules and ethical standards
that were adopted to facilitate it.
The shift began in 2002, following the Bush Administration’s reinterpretation of laws designed to prevent and criminalize the prac∗
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1
See, e.g., British Medical Association, Medicine Betrayed (1992); Steven H.
Miles, Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity and the War on Terror (2006);
Physicians for Human Rights, Torture and Turkey and its Medical Accomplices
(1996); Eric Stover & Elena Nightingale, The Breaking of Bodies and Minds (1985);
M. Gregg Bloche, Uruguay’s Military Physicians: Cogs in a System of State Terror, 255
JAMA 2788 (1986); Vincent Iacopino et al., Physician Complicity in Misrepresentation
and Omission of Evidence of Torture in Post-Detention Medical Examinations in Turkey, 276
JAMA 396 (1996); Chen Reis et al., Physician Participation in Human Rights Abuses in
Southern Iraq, 291 JAMA 1480 (2004).
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tice of torture, starting with the White House General Counsel’s repudiation of the Geneva Conventions as a guide to interrogation of
2
detainees captured in Afghanistan and the Department of Justice’s
3
infamous reinterpretation of the statute criminalizing torture.
These legal strategies opened the door to the widespread use of torture . By late 2002, the Secretary of Defense approved the use of interrogation techniques that included the use of stress positions, sleep
deprivation, isolation, threats, the use of dogs to induce fear, and
4
many forms of humiliation. The Guantánamo interrogation logs of
the so-called twentieth 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed al-Qahtani, ob5
tained by Time Magazine , reveal how interrogators, frustrated by the
detainees’ unwillingness to provide helpful responses after many
weeks of interrogation used newly authorized methods of torture.
They also reveal how physicians and psychologists became caught up
in the vortex of torture.
The centerpiece of the interrogation strategy was long-term isolation and sleep deprivation, and al-Qahtani was interrogated for
eighteen to twenty hours a day for forty-eight to fifty-four consecutive
days while he was in isolation, which extended over a period of 160
6
days. At various times interrogators used techniques including stress
positions, exploitation of phobias, threats, use of military dogs, temperature extremes (including seventeen occasions when water was
poured over his head), incessant loud music, and many forms of deg7
radation. Among many other humiliations, al-Qahtani was forced to
perform dog tricks on a leash, engage in sexually degrading acts in-

2
Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W. Bush re: Draft
Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS
118 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
3
Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 172; see generally JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 89–95 (2006); David Luban, Liberalism: Torture and the Ticking
Bomb, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35–83 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006);
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TORTURE BY U.S. FORCES (2005), available at http://www.physiciansfor
humanrights.org/library/documents/reports/ break-them-down-the.pdf [hereinafter BREAK THEM DOWN].
4
BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 72–101.
5
Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME,
June 20, 2005, at 26, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1071284,00.html?internalid=AM2.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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cluding standing naked before female interrogators and wearing
women’s underwear, was subjected to having female interrogators
engage in lap dances and massage his back and neck, and was forced
8
to dance with a male interrogator. A female interrogator squatted
9
over his Koran. He was also told that his sister was a whore, that he
10
had homosexual tendencies, and that other detainees knew of this.
While a Department of Defense review concluded that none of
these techniques, either alone or in combination, violated prohibi11
tions against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,

8

Id.
Id. The techniques used are also described in an official report of the Department of Defense. RANDALL SCHMITT, ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT,
INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA
DETENTION FACILITY (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/
d20050714report.pdf (as amended June 9, 2006).
10
Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5.
11
Schmitt, supra note 9. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984,
108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/h_cat39.htm. Article One of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. In ratifying the Convention, the Senate adopted reservations, declarations and
understandings concerning its interpretation by the United States. See Michael John
Garcia, CRS Report to Congress, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens (Updated April 4, 2006), available
at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1339.pdf. These included a definition
of severe mental pain or suffering, which was also incorporated in a criminal statute
enacted by Congress. That definition is
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from—
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . .
18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
9
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the State Department, which is responsible for assessing the human
rights record of governments around the world, had long considered
these techniques to be violations of international human rights and
12
humanitarian law standards prohibiting torture. The medical and
psychological literature is, moreover, replete with evidence that harsh
psychological techniques like isolation, severe humiliation, inducement of fear, hooding, and other techniques can bring about severe
anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, cognitive impairment, depres13
sion, and even psychotic symptoms. Many of these conditions were
indeed apparent to observers at Guantánamo and elsewhere. FBI
agents and Red Cross officials reported the mental deterioration of
detainees at Guantánamo and even the Department of Defense reported more than 350 acts of self-harm at Guantánamo, including
14
120 “hanging gestures” in 2003 alone.
The very harshness and danger of the techniques, together with
the goal of seeking every advantage in devising interrogation strategies that could break prisoners, led intelligence and defense officials
to bring in doctors and psychologists to help⎯as designers of interrogation strategies, as consultants to interrogators, as “safeguards”
and monitors, and as medical interveners when needed. All these
15
roles were apparent in the al-Qahtani interrogation log, and they all
became institutionalized as U.S. interrogation strategies developed
from 2002 on.
The Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 13, 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article Thirteen requires that prisoners of war (POWs) must at all
times be treated humanely, and that any unlawful act or omission by the detaining
power that causes death or seriously endangers the health of a POW will be regarded
as a serious breach of the Convention. Id. art 13. Article Seventeen provides: “[N]o
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” Id. art. 17. The provisions of Article Three
common to all four of the Geneva Conventions prohibit violence to life and person,
including cruel treatment and torture, as well as outrages upon personal dignity—in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment—regardless of whether the conflict
is of an international nature or whether a person has POW status. Id. art. 3.
12
For a review of Department of State interpretations of which interrogation
practices amount to torture, see Tom Malinowski, Banned State Department Practices, in
TORTURE: DOES IT MAKE US SAFER? IS IT EVER OK? 139–44 (Kenneth Roth, Minky
Worden & Amy D. Bernstein eds., 2005).
13
BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 48–71.
14
Paisley Dodds, Mass Suicides Attempted at Guantánamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, reported
in PITT. TRIB. REV., Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/s_296479.html.
15
Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5.
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Let me illustrate the last role of doctors and psychiatrists⎯as
medical interveners⎯first. In the al-Qahtani interrogation there are
16
frequent references to medical monitoring. In the midst of his brutal interrogation, al-Qahtani, in protest, refused to take water, and a
medical corpsman reported that he was becoming seriously dehy17
drated. Eventually he was put under a doctor’s care and interrogators allowed an unprecedented twenty-four-hour interruption in the
interrogation; but even in the midst of receiving medical care, inter18
rogators continued to deny him sleep by playing loud music. AlQahtani’s heartbeat became quite slow, and he was transferred to a
19
hospital. Tests including an electrocardiogram, CT scan, and ultra20
sound were ordered, and a second doctor was brought in. Eventually al-Qahtani was allowed to sleep, and after receiving medical
21
clearance, was “hooded, shackled and restrained in a litter” and
22
brought back for resumption of the interrogation.
It is hard to imagine a more unseemly and unethical role for a
physician, who is supposed to be dedicated to a person’s well being,
than to intervene medically in the midst of ongoing torture⎯even
23
administering care while the detainee is deprived of sleep ⎯so that
torture can continue. That is why the mere presence of a physician
while someone is being tortured⎯not to mention the participation of
a physician as a facilitator, enabler, or monitor of torture⎯has been
condemned in ethics codes as a gross violation of core medical values
24
of promoting well-being and doing no harm. The World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, for example, adopted thirty years
ago, affirms that “[t]he physician’s fundamental role is to alleviate
the distress of his or her fellow human beings, and no motive,
whether personal, collective or political, shall prevail against this

16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5.
22
Id. For additional roles health personnel played in intervening in this interrogation, see Stephen Miles, Medical Ethics and the Interrogation of Guantánamo 063, 7 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 1 (2007).
23
Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5.
24
See, e.g., Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel,
Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
37/194, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (Dec. 18, 1982) [hereinafter Principles of Medical Ethics].
17
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25

higher purpose.” It specifically prohibits the physician from engaging in or facilitating torture in any way, including actions “to diminish
the ability of the victim to resist such treatment” or even being present when “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is
26
used or threatened.” Similar ethical standards have been adopted
27
by other health professions and by the U.N. General Assembly, and
the American Medical Association’s own standards are even more explicit regarding evaluation or treatment to enable torture to begin or
continue. Its standards provide that “[p]hysicians may treat prisoners
or detainees if doing so is in their best interests, but physicians should
not treat individuals to verify their health so that torture can begin or
28
continue.”
Despite these admonitions, the participation of medical personnel was fairly common in interrogations conducted by U.S. forces. A
survey conducted by the Army Surgeon General revealed that as of
mid-2005, seventeen percent of responding health personnel in Afghanistan and ten percent in Iraq stated that they had been present
29
during interrogation.
We do not know precisely what role they
played, but medical monitoring during harsh interrogation, including clearance to proceed or continue, seems a likely candidate.
A second role physicians and psychologists have played in interrogations is as a purported safeguard. It is unclear whether a physician or psychologist signed off on al-Qahtani’s interrogation, though
as discussed below, psychologists were involved in developing it.
Later on, however, this role became explicit. A working group that
made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in 2003 advised
that certain harsh interrogation tactics should be subject to medical
30
review, and the Secretary of Defense and other commanders re-

25

World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo, Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment (as amended May 2006), available at http://www.wma.net/
e/policy/c18.htm.
26
Id.
27
Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 24.
28
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS, 2005–2006 ed., opinion E-2.067, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8421.html.
29
DEP’T OF ARMY, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, FINAL REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF
DETAINEE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR OEF, GTMO AND OIF (Apr. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/detmedopsrprt/detmedopsrpt.pdf [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT].
30
SEC’Y OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND
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quired that interrogation plans involving isolation, sleep deprivation,
dietary restrictions, sensory deprivation, and other techniques receive
31
When Behavioral Science Consultation
to medical clearance.
Teams (“BSCTs” or “biscuits”) were put into place as a formal means
of bringing health professionals into the interrogation process, one
of the purported functions was indeed to act in a “safety officer
32
role” and be responsible for ensuring that interrogations are conducted in a safe, ethical, and legal manner. This role and official justification remains in place today. The Army’s new field manual on
human intelligence gathering, issued in the fall of 2006, for example,
eliminates many previously authorized unlawful interrogation techniques, but retains a requirement of medical approval and monitoring for an interrogation strategy called “separation”—a euphemism
33
for prolonged isolation.
Let’s put aside the fact that physicians and psychologists have no
training in this “safeguarding” function. Let’s put aside, too, the
ethical outrage of requiring medical personnel to sign off on deliberate infliction of physical and mental harm. Let’s even put aside the
fact that, as I will discuss in a moment, health professionals were also
assigned a function that contradicts this role⎯to design interrogations that would be “effective,” which could include the possibility of
making them harsher. The fact is that, as in other cases in recent history, the dynamic of torture is such that purported safeguards intended to guard against overzealous use of harsh interrogation techniques never work⎯approvals of interrogators’ increasingly
34
aggressive methods simply become routine. In the absence of an
extraordinarily firm and persistent objection by the monitoring
health professional, engaging medical personnel in approving interrogation plans and monitoring for “safety” purposes amounts to giving interrogators a green light. At best, this monitoring role requires
health personnel to calibrate the degree of harm to be “acceptably”
inflicted during an interrogation.
The third role is the most pernicious of all: the direct involvement of health professionals, especially psychologists and psychiaOPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 10–18, 18–21 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf.
31
See BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 45--47.
32
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 18-15.
33
U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS
(2006), app. M (authorizing “separation,” or isolation, up to thirty days or longer,
provided certain approvals and “safeguards” are in place).
34
Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen Xenakis, Torture and Psychological Warfare, in
WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., forthcoming 2007).
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trists, in the design of interrogation strategies to break down detainees. The al-Qahtani log suggests that psychologists helped design the
interrogation plan, with all its aggressive assaults on his mind as well
as his body, and advised interrogators along the way. The logs also
show that BSCT members directed interrogators to keep al-Qahtani
35
from sleeping, among other instructions. The psychologists, physicians, and others were assigned to BSCTs specifically for the purpose
of using their knowledge to assess detainees, design interrogation
strategies, and advise interrogators. According to the Army Surgeon
General’s report, their purposes included “[r]eviewing detainee information”; “[p]roviding [an] opinion on character and personality
of detainees”; “[c]onsulting on interrogation plan and approach”;
36
and “[p]roviding feedback on interrogation technique.” This role
included identifying the vulnerabilities of detainees and helping intelligence officials exploit them. According to the report, interrogators are taught to interact with BSCT personnel, to learn the medical
history of detainees with a focus on “depression, delusional behaviors,
37
manifestations of stress,” and “what are their buttons.” The interrogators are trained that this BSCT staff will assist them with “obtaining
more accurate intelligence information, knowing how to gain better
rapport with detainees, and also knowing when to push or not push harder
38
in the pursuit of intelligence information.”
One means of carrying out this charge was to bring in Guantánamo BSCT psychologists and others familiar with techniques used
to train American soldiers to resist harsh interrogation tactics—like
stress positions, isolation, sleep deprivation, threats, sensory deprivation and overload, temperature extremes, and many forms of humiliation—in a program called Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Es39
They, in turn, transformed those methods into
cape (“SERE”).

35

Miles, supra note 22, at 2.
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 18-12, 18-13.
37
Id. at 19-7.
38
Id. (emphasis added).
39
See Mark Benjamin, Torture Teachers, SALON.COM, June 29, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/06/29/torture/index.html; Jane Mayer,
The
Experiment,
NEW
YORKER,
July
11--18,
2005,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050711fa_fact4; M. Gregg Bloche &
Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and Interrogators at Guantánamo Bay, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED.
6 (2005). The use of these techniques has a long gestation, deriving from Communist practices in Korea and CIA-sponsored experiments in the 1950s. MARGULIES, supra note 3, at 120–25; ALFRED MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 25–53 (2006); Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense, Criminal Investigation Task Force (Deployed),
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to JTF-GTMO/J2, re: JTF GTMO “SERE” Interrogation SOP
36
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interrogation techniques for terror suspects and had major influence
in designing and controlling interrogation strategy. One member of
a BSCT interviewed for the Army Surgeon General’s report noted
40
having received specific training in SERE techniques. According to
the New York Times, psychologists also advised the CIA in devising its
“enhanced” interrogation techniques, including water-boarding, or
41
feigned drowning. Indeed, because of their familiarity with, and authorization of, these forms of torture, it is entirely possible, even
likely, that the participation of BSCT psychologists in the design of
interrogation techniques significantly expanded the use of torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in the interrogation of
terror suspects⎯and in the infliction of severe or serious mental
harm. The full extent of these practices can only be known once
there is full disclosure of interrogation plans and practices, including
disclosure of available logs of specific interrogations.
The engagement of psychologists and physicians also has had
implications for the use of medical and psychological information
about detainees for interrogation. The Army Surgeon General’s report makes clear that sharing of medical information about detainees
42
was widespread in U.S detention facilities. Generally, the sharing of
43
44
information was permissive, but in some cases, it was mandatory.
Moreover, the report found that rules for interrogator access to
medical records themselves were vague or non-existent. As a result,
at three of the Iraq facilities where the highest number of military
personnel were questioned for the report⎯Abu Ghraib, Camp Cropper, and Camp Liberty⎯between six and seven percent of respondents said that anyone could have access to detainee medical records,
DTD (Dec. 10 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/projects/foiasearch/
pdf/DOD045202.pdf.
40
See Army Medicine, Assessment Report Interviews (DVD on file with author).
Assessment Report Interviews may be ordered at http://www.armymedicine.
army.mil/news/detmedopsrprt/interviews.cfm.
41
Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics In Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2005, at A1. According to the Washington Post, psychologists were also involved in designing kidnappings as part of the CIA’s rendition program. Dana Priest, Wrongful
Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake; German Citizen Released After Months of “Rendition,” WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1.
42
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 7-5. The report noted that detainee medical information is to be protected in accordance with applicable law and
regulations. Id.
43
See id. It notes that “healthcare providers will not be required to verbally provide detainee medical information to intelligence collectors.” Id.
44
Id. “Medical personnel shall provide interrogators such information as they
believe necessary to protect the health and safety of the detainee or to prevent the
commission of a crime.” Id.
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and between seven and nine percent said interrogators could have
45
46
access to them. At Camp Liberty the percentage was even higher.
In Afghanistan, six percent of respondents at the Kandahar detention
47
facility said interrogators could have access to records.
Too few
health professionals were surveyed at Guantánamo to gain an understanding of the practice there, but a report of the International
Committee of the Red Cross in mid-2004 found that medical files of
detainees were open to interrogators, and that the “apparent integration of access to medical care within the system of coercion” resulted
48
in inmates refusing to seek medical care or cooperate with doctors.
When these three roles began to be disclosed in the media and
subjected to stinging critiques in medical journals in the United
States and abroad, the Department of Defense, far from restoring
traditional domestic and international ethical standards, decided in
2005 to adopt guidelines to explicitly authorize and regularize medical participation in interrogation. These guidelines were revised in
2006 without significant change in the prescribed role for health per49
sonnel, except to state a preference for psychologists in BSCTs. The
guidelines departed substantially from international ethical stan50
dards, including those adopted by the United Nations. They did so
especially by effectively exempting health professionals who are participating in intelligence work but not providing clinical care to detainees from the strictures that would otherwise apply, including the
twin obligations of beneficence and non-maleficence (i.e., doing no
harm). The most recent guidelines explicitly permit participation by
health professionals to act as advisers to interrogators so as long as
45

SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 12-2, 12-3.
Id. At Tikrit, Mosul, and Camp Bucca, the percentage was somewhat lower. See
id. at 12-3 and 12-4.
47
See id. at 12-1, 12-2. Respondents at Bagram denied sharing detainee medical
records with “anyone” or with interrogators. Id.
48
Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/
30gitmo.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=825f1aa04c65241f&ex=1259470800&part
ner=rssnyt.
49
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2310.08E, MEDICAL PROGRAM SUPPORT
FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS (2006), available at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/231008_060606
/231008p.pdf; Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Def. for Health Affairs to
the Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts et al., Medical Program Principles and Procedures for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed
Forces of the United States (June 3, 2005).
50
Leonard S. Rubenstein et al., Coercive US Interrogation Policies: A Challenge to
Medical Ethics, 294 JAMA 1544, 1545 (2005); see also M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H.
Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2005).
46
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they are insulated from providing clinical care to detainees. The
BSCTs are also permitted to perform psychological assessments of the
character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral characteristics of detainees, and based on such assessments, advise interrogators on strategies and methods that are based on that particularized knowledge. The guidelines also permit the use of medical
records for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security purposes, subject only to pro forma reporting and approval requirements.
What is the appropriate response of the medical and psychological community, as well as the larger society, to the role of doctors,
psychologists, and other health professionals as enablers and facilitators of torture and cruel treatment? Their first obligation, it seems to
me, is to condemn the techniques used as the devastatingly harmful
infringements on human dignity that they are. Professionals profoundly concerned with health and well-being have an obligation to
speak up. Two years after the Abu Ghraib photos brought prisoner
abuse to everyone’s attention, professional associations offered only
general condemnations of torture and said little about the terrible
51
harms being inflicted. Recently, however, some associations found
a voice. As Congress debated the military commission bills in late
2006, the presidents of the American Psychiatric Association and
American Psychological Association, along with others, condemned
the brutality of “enhanced interrogation methods” reportedly used by
52
the CIA. They went on to say that “prolonged sleep deprivation, induced hypothermia, stress positions, shaking, sensory deprivation and
overload, and possibly water-boarding . . . among other reported
techniques . . . can have a devastating impact on the victim’s physical
53
and mental health.”
The second responsibility, both of the professions and the larger
society, is to resist participation by medical personnel in interrogation
54
or in any effort to break detainees.
While this may seem self-

51

See MILES, supra note 1, at 119–39. The American College of Physicians, which
is an association of specialists in internal medicine, was a notable exception.
52
See Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, PHR and Seven Leading Health
Professionals Call for Prohibition of Abusive CIA Interrogation Tactics in Detainee Treatment
and Trial Bill; Congress Must Not Cede Interpretation of Geneva Conventions to President
(Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news2006-09-22.html.
53
Id.
54
This includes participation in breaking hunger strikes. See George J. Annas,
Hunger Strikers at Guantánamo—Medical Ethics and Human Rights in a “Legal Black
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evident, it is a more contentious question than it first appears. At the
extreme, some ethicists, building on the recognition that health professionals sometimes appropriately subordinate duties to individuals
55
to some legitimate social purpose, argue for balancing the traditional ethical duty to do no harm against a purported role in protect56
ing national security⎯even at the expense of human rights. This
position is untenable not only because it would implicate health professionals directly in facilitating torture that governments themselves
are bound by law to prevent, even in national emergencies, but also
because it would require them to engage in decisions about how to
balance national security interests against the health and rights of the
57
individual—decisions they are in no position to make.
An alternative, and more sound, approach is to ground the responsibilities of health professionals in human rights law, since health
professionals have an obligation not to become complicit in, much
58
less facilitate, human rights violations committed by states. There
are, however, two quite different variants of this position. What may
be called the formal approach is to specify that health professionals
can participate in interrogation so long as they adhere to the requirements of human rights law prohibiting torture or cruel, inhu59
man, or degrading treatment or punishment. This is the position of
the American Psychological Association, which like medical organiza60
tions, has embraced the ethical commitment to do no harm. Accordingly, the American Psychological Association adopted recom-

Hole,” 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377 (2006); see also World Medical Association Declaration on Hunger Strikers (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/h31.htm.
55
M. Gregg Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 275 (2001); M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA 268 (1999).
56
Michael Gross, Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Mapping the Moral Dimensions of
Medicine and War, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT No. 6, 22 (2004).
57
See Leslie London, et al., Dual Loyalty Among Military Health Professionals: Human
Rights and Ethics in Times of Armed Conflict, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS
381 (2006); Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT No 4
(2005).
58
London, supra note 58; Marks, supra note 58; see Physicians for Human Rights
and University of Cape Town Health Sciences Centre, Dual Loyalty and Human Rights
in Health Professional Practice: Proposed Guidelines and Institutional Mechanisms (2003),
available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-dualloyalty2006.html [hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights].
59
See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION’S PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.apa.org/releases/
PENSTaskForceReportFinal.pdf.
60
See id.
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mendations of a task force on ethics and national security that permitted the participation of psychologists in interrogation, and later
61
adopted strong human rights principles for psychologists to follow.
Under this view, psychologists may design interrogation techniques,
assess individuals for interrogation with the goal of devising the most
effective methods of eliciting information from them, advise interrogators about both the individual and the techniques, observe interrogations, and further advise interrogators as the interrogation moves
62
They may be an integral part of the interrogation
forward.
team⎯so long as they take care not to violate the individual’s human
rights. Advancing this position, the American Psychological Association’s then-president (and my fellow panelist), Dr. Gerald Koocher,
criticized the view of those who express “dismay that psychologists
63
participate in coercive interviews or interrogation at all.” Rather, he
argued, while human rights must be respected, “[w]e must also respect the legitimate roles of psychologists who participate in interro64
gation legally and appropriately in an effort to assure our safety.”
While this argument has surface appeal in relying firmly on human rights principles, it is problematic in taking little account of the
context or realities of interrogation, especially in national security interrogations that take place in isolated settings where detainees lack
access to the courts or legal representation, and where there is no
mechanism at all to protect them from violations of rights. At a
minimum, allowing participation but requiring disengagement if
human rights violations are taking place, requires the health professional to determine what practices, alone or in combination, amount
to human rights violations, and to do so in an environment in which
the government has a record of adopting very narrow definitions of
torture and cruel treatment. It also requires health professionals to
try to distinguish between the particular techniques used in interrogation and the conditions of confinement that in some cases have
been designed to, and indeed have contributed to, the breaking
65
down of detainees in violation of their human rights. Thus, even
determining when interrogation is in violation of human rights stan-
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See id.; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, RESOLUTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.apa.org/governance/resolutions/notortureres.html.
62
See AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N REPORT, supra note 60.
63
Gerald Koocher, Valued and Varied Roles, 37 APA MONITOR No. 7 (2006), available at http://www. apa.org/monitor/julaug06/pc.html.
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Id.
65
See Lewis, supra note 49.

RUBENSTEIN FINAL

746

4/12/2007 5:01:50 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:733

dards may be well nigh impossible in the context in which the decisions have to be made.
Even more significant, the environment in which the health professional must make the decision is fraught with pressures and conflicts of interest. As former American Psychological Association President Philip Zimbardo has written, the premise that psychologists (or
other health professionals) can make distinctions between permissible and impermissible interrogation, with full power to confront,
challenge, and expose unethical practices, ignores the fact that the
professionals are part of an operational team, who are
susceptible to normative pressures to conform to the emerging
standards of that group. They cannot make readily informed
ethical decisions because they do not have full knowledge of how
their personal contributions are being used in secret or classified
missions. Their judgments and decisions may be made under
conditions of uncertainty, and may include high stress. Moreover,
definitions of basic terms are not constant, but shifting, so it becomes difficult or impossible to make a fully informed ethical
66
judgment about any specific aspect of one’s functions.

Zimbardo also identifies the tremendous pressure on participants to
be “team players” in obtaining actionable intelligence, and hence not
67
to question procedures and tactics being used.
Questioning requests to participate in interrogations that may violate human rights
may jeopardize professionals’ own career advancement goals. Given
these factors, Zimbardo concludes, “[e]ven intelligent, well-meaning
and moral psychologists can be seduced into engaging in behaviors
that they would ordinarily deem unacceptable once they get enmeshed in situationally defined roles and adopt new situated identi68
ties.”
Finally, despite its formal attractiveness, whether a technique violates human rights may not be an adequate standard for assessing
whether health professionals should participate in the interrogation
process given the nature of that process and their ethical commitments. As noted above, health professionals do sometimes subordi69
nate the interests of patients to important social purposes, and these
66

Philip Zimbardo, Commentary on Report of the American Psychological Association's
Presidential Task Force: On Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS report), July
19, 2006 (unpublished, on file with the author); see also Robert Lifton, Doctors and
Torture, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 415 (2004); Bloche & Marks, supra note 40.
67
Zimbardo, supra note 67.
68
Id.
69
See Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, supra note 56; Bloche, Clinical Loyalties
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 56.
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purposes may include breaches of confidentiality to protect innocent
third parties, the need to control epidemic disease, and other pur70
poses. The consequences of loyalty to social purposes rather than to
the patient may be to create legal jeopardy or violate privacy. But
there is a significant difference between the abandonment of the patient’s interests, as important as they may be, and the direct infliction
of physical harm or psychological stress that is the inevitable consequence of any national security interrogation. Interrogation for intelligence purposes is inevitably a deliberate effort to create anxiety, severe discomfort, pain, or stress in the interest of forcing disclosure of
information. Thus, it is unlike any of the kinds of harms that often
befall an individual when advancing legitimate state interests over
those of the individual. This does not mean that interrogation is itself illegitimate, for while interrogators are not bound to do no harm,
health professionals are. Just as in states where the death penalty is
legal and seen as morally permissible, physicians are ethically bound
71
not to participate.
Accordingly, only a bright line rule against any participation by
health professionals in the interrogation of an individual will be effective in preserving ethical standards, protecting the integrity of the
profession, and, just as important, assuring the society at large that
the health professions are acting in accordance with moral expectations. The World Medical Association has recently taken this stance,
adopting an amendment to its Declaration of Tokyo that provides:
“The physician shall not use nor allow to be used, as far as he or she
can, medical knowledge or skills, or health information specific to
individuals, to facilitate or otherwise aid any interrogation, legal or
72
73
illegal, of those individuals.” The American Psychiatric Association
70
See Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, supra note 56; Bloche, Clinical Loyalties
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 56.; Physicians for Human Rights, supra
note 59, at 51–52.
71
AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, OPINION E-2.06,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/8419.html.
72
World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo, Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention
and
Imprisonment
(as
amended
May,
2006),
available
at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c18.htm.
73
The Association adopted a resolution that provides as follows:
No psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of persons held in custody by military or civilian investigative or law enforcement authorities, whether in the United States or elsewhere. Direct
participation includes being present in the interrogation room, asking
or suggesting questions, or advising authorities on the use of specific
techniques of interrogation with particular detainees. However, psy-
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74

and American Medical Association have adopted a similar stance
against participation in individual interrogations. In its role of setting standards for military and intelligence operations, Congress, the
Department of Defense, the CIA, and other agencies should follow
suit and remove health professionals, no matter their assigned role,
from aiding in the interrogation of detainees.
In an era when physicians, psychologists and health professionals
play many social roles beyond the provision of clinical care, where an
ethical stance can be compromised by demands of managed care entities and pressures from pharmaceutical companies, and in an atmosphere where obtaining real-time intelligence about terrorism is
claimed to trump any other concerns, the obligation to do no harm
may appear quaint. But just as then-White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales’s dismissal of elements of the Geneva Conventions as quaint
led to systematic prisoner abuse, abandoning this long-held obligation would lead only to corruption of the role of the professions and
an increase in the horrors inflicted on detainees. Nonparticipation
of health professionals in the interrogation of detainees should be an
ethical commitment of the professions and a core element of national policy on human intelligence gathering.

chiatrists may provide training to military or civilian investigative or law
enforcement personnel on recognizing and responding to persons with
mental illnesses, on the possible medical and psychological effects of
particular techniques and conditions of interrogation, and on other
areas within their professional expertise.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES,
POSITION STATEMENT (May 2006), available at www.psych.org/edu/other_res/
lib_archives/archives/200601.pdf.
74
The resolution provides that “[p]hysicians must neither conduct nor directly
participate in an interrogation, because a role as physician-interrogator undermines
the physician’s role as healer and thereby erodes trust in the individual physicianinterrogator and in the medical profession.” AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, 10-A-06: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION (Res. 1, I-05),
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_recs_
10a06.pdf. It also prohibits monitoring interrogations and allows general training
for interrogation purposes. Id.

